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In November 1598 the English administration in Dublin received several shocking 
advertisements that the loyal and trusted Old English Sheriff of Kildare, James Fitzpiers 
Fitzgerald, had defected to Hugh O’Neill’s Irish Catholic confederacy.  But, while 
English administrators sifted though the evidence – which included a written patriotic 
plea from Hugh O’Neill himself, as well reports of Fitzpiers’s presence at the seizing of 
fortifications and the spoiling of crown subjects – his friend, Captain Thomas Lee, was 
making the case that Fitzpiers was playing the not so covert part of a ‘secret traitor’ in 
order to infiltrate rebel forces and ultimately overthrow the Irish rebellion.  The ensuing 
investigation revealed a story of multiple conspiracies, double agents, ideological 
manipulation, and dangerous factional rivalries.  Thus, by exploring the issue of secret 
traitors through the unusual case of James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald, this article may also serve 
to highlight some of the methods employed by Hugh O’Neill to rouse support for an Irish 
Catholic crusade while drawing attention to some of the more mundane factors which 
might have induced less prominent Old Englishmen to switch their allegiances during the 
Nine Years’ War. 
 
I 
 
For centuries, the Gaelic Irish had been deemed enemies to the English crown 
while the Old English descendants of Ireland’s twelfth-century Anglo-Norman 
conquerors had been considered loyal subjects.  But, having long preserved the English 
crown’s administrative and martial interests in Ireland, the sixteenth century witnessed 
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the gradual displacement of Old Englishmen from positions of trust and authority.  
Although the Old English had generally preferred diplomacy to armed insurrection when 
responding to the crown’s religious, economic, and political reforms, over time, the 
repeated failure of their embassies and petitions left many Old Englishmen feeling 
increasingly disenchanted with the authority they had long championed.  Crown-
community relations became ever more strained over the course of the century and, 
during the 1570s and 80s, murmur turned into open dissent, with periodic episodes of 
violence erupting even within the heart of Ireland’s English jurisdiction.1  Rather than 
extinguishing political and economic resentment, the government’s punitive responses to 
these occasions may have actually hardened Old English opinions and attitudes, 
especially amongst those affected by the harsh penalties of confiscation and execution.2  
But, while the Old English may have grown more indignant, it also seems they had 
become more closeted in their criticisms.  Indeed, by February 1596, Secretary Sir 
Geoffrey Fenton expressed deep concern that the nobility of Leinster and the Pale ‘seame 
to be discontented, but touching the causes, they are closs and pryvat to themselves, 
which makes me dowtfull of further hydden matter then I dare ayme at’.3   
The 1590s would test Old English allegiances like never before.  Besides marking 
the outbreak of war on a scale unprecedented in Ireland, this period witnessed the 
repatriation of militant clerical exiles and the deployment of a sophisticated patriotic 
rhetoric by Hugh O’Neill and his confederate allies.  This propaganda, touting 
                                                
1 For discussions on Old English uprisings during 1570s and 80s see Helen Coburn Walshe, ‘The rebellion 
of William Nugent 1581’ in R. V. Comerford, Mary Cullen, Jacqueline R. Hill, and Colm Lennon (eds), 
Religion, conflict and coexistence in Ireland (Dublin, 1990), pp 26-52; Christopher Maginn, ‘Civilizing’ 
Gaelic Leinster: the extension of Tudor rule in the O’Byrne and O’Toole lordships (Dublin, 2005); idem, 
‘The Baltinglass Rebellion, 1580: English dissent or a Gaelic uprising?’ in Historical Journal, xlvii, no. 2 
(Jun. 2004), pp 205-32. 
2 Ciaran Brady, ‘Conservative subversives: the community of the Pale and the Dublin administration, 1556-
86’ in P. J. Corish (ed.), Radicals, rebels and establishments (Belfast, 1985), pp 26-28.  Lennon has posited 
that government reaction ‘provoked a variety of responses under the general aegis of the movement for the 
defence of the Catholic heritage’:  Colm Lennon, ‘The Counter-Reformation in Ireland, 1542-1641’ in 
Ciaran Brady and Raymond Gillespie (eds), Natives and Newcomers (Blackrock, 1986), p. 86. 
3 Sir Geoffrey Fenton to Burghley, 29 Feb. 1596 (T.N.A., SP 63/186/90). 
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attachments to native soil and the old religion, purposefully targeted the Old English 
community with promises of certain privileges which had since been denied by the 
English crown.4  Fearing the traditionally feuding Old English and Gaelic Irish might 
now find common cause in their grievances against English government, most English 
administrators had come to the conclusion that none of Ireland’s inhabitants, regardless 
of ethnic origin or religious persuasion, could be trusted.  Indeed, as the author of The 
Supplication of the Blood of the English remarked after the 1598 revolt in Munster:  
 
If wee should preasume to perswade yore Majestie to trust none Irishe, wee 
should perswad you to the safest course for yore kingedome, the safest course 
for yore subiects, the safest course for yore selfe. Althoughe assuredly there 
are some, whose faith if it were thoroughly knowne doth well deserve trust. 
Yet that some are soe fewe as that it is better for you to trust none, then to 
hazard the lightinge on them that are disloyall.5    
 
Nevertheless, some contemporary English observers did not see Irish loyalties as 
quite so straightforward.  Thomas Lee, an English army captain with a colourful Irish 
career, was convinced that there were categories and gradations amongst those whom he 
considered traitors.6  Lee identified two types of Irish traitors, the first of which he 
termed ‘open traitors’.  These were the Gaelic Irish and those defiant and perverted Old 
English borderers who were perpetually occupied in some armed action.  His more 
interesting designation was that grouping he termed ‘secret traitors’, and these, Lee 
                                                
4 Hiram Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill and the Nine Years War in Tudor Ireland’ in Historical Journal, xxxvi, no. 
1 (Mar. 1993), pp 25-6. 
5 Willy Maley (ed.), ‘The Supplication of the blood of the English most lamentably murdered in Ireland, 
Cryeng out of the yearth for revenge (1598)’ in Analecta Hibernica, no. 36 (1995), pp 36-7.   
6 Thomas Lee, ‘The Discovery and Recovery of Ireland with the Author’s Apology’ c. 1599-1600 (B. L., 
Additional MS 33,743), ed. John McGurk, www.celt.ie/history (24 July 2010).  Lee was not alone in this 
impression and similar views were expressed by other authors: Fynes Moryson, Shakespeare’s Europe, ed. 
Charles Hughes (London, 1903), pp 205-7; ‘A Direction to the Queenes Majestie how to conquer Ireland’ 
1599 (B.L., Harley MS 292, f. 173); Exeter College, Oxford, MS 154, ff 66r-66v; Maley (ed.), ‘The 
Supplication’, p. 71. 
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argued, were far more dangerous than open traitors.  Open traitors could be identified and 
neutralised with relative ease, but secret traitors were extremely difficult to detect as they 
‘seeme to bee subjectes yet doe covertly succore mayntayne and relieve the open 
Traytours’.7  And, according to Lee, these secret traitors could be divided into three 
classes:  
 
The first mightie in power, place and auchthoritie, The second of resonable 
abilitie and meanes and indifferently respected and graced by the state there.  
The third are in generallitie some favouringe the open Traitours for their 
pretensed cause of Religion, which are a great part of the recusants, and some 
affectinge the goodes, landes and places which some good subjects have 
interest in, other glad to be revenged for private grudges, other to make 
comodities by the open traytours meanes.8   
 
Although other English administrators may not have been quite as discerning as 
Lee, there was little doubt that these treacherous malefactors did exist.  It was widely 
assumed that confederate leader Hugh O’Neill employed secret operatives within the Pale 
to sabotage the heart of Ireland’s English jurisdiction.  Indeed, as early as 1594 Lord 
Deputy Russell was ‘greatly suspecting that the earle hath som great practis with many in 
the english pall and som others of great account or ells hee wold never carye him self so 
vndutyfully as he doth’.9  Captain Lee went a step further, claiming that some rebels had 
boasted to him that ‘our frends amongst youe doe us more good than all those that are 
forth in action with us’.10   
There was every reason to suspect that this was the case.  Hugh O’Neill and the 
rebel Confederacy possessed a remarkable knowledge of crown government and military 
affairs; in fact, O’Neill actually bragged that he was informed of Council resolutions 
                                                
7 Lee, ‘The Discovery’ f. 5. 
8 Ibid., f. 7. 
9 Lord Deputy Russell to Robert Cecil, 22 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/176/33). 
10 Lee, ‘Apologie’ f. 17. 
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almost immediately after they had been passed, even at supposedly secret meetings.11  
Naturally, English-born administrators were reluctant to suspect one of their own of such 
duplicity and cast their eyes upon the usual suspects: their Irish-born colleagues.  As Lord 
Deputy Mountjoy’s secretary, Fynes Moryson, argued, ‘our secrett Counsells’ must have 
been betrayed by Old English insiders because ‘who could more iustly be suspected of 
this falsehood, then the Counsellors of State, borne in that kingdome’.12  Indeed, he was 
of the firm opinion ‘that the English Irish made Counsellors of State, and Judges of 
Courts did euidently hurt the publike good, and that their falseharted helpe, did more 
hinder reformation, then the open Acts of the Rebells’.13   
Conspiracy theories had been rampant since the war’s inception, and rumours 
involving some of the leading Old English inhabitants of Leinster and Munster had been 
widely circulated.14  Most of the evidence acquired by the state, however, was based on 
hearsay or hypotheses, and concrete evidence against many suspects remained 
remarkably hard to find.15  Nevertheless, it was fairly assumed that the more successful 
O’Neill’s military enterprise, the more likely wavering Old English borderers and 
Palesmen were to embrace his propaganda and join him, either for fear of his 
chastisement or in expectation of an Irish Catholic victory.  And, by the autumn of 1598, 
with the Irish administration in the hands of an indecisive committee, it became clear that 
the rebellion was reaching a crescendo and many of these rumoured conspiracies could 
become reality.16   
                                                
11 For example, see John Morgan to Lord Deputy Russell, 10 Jul. 1596 (T.N.A., SP 63/191/18); Marshal Sir 
Henry Bagenall to Russell, 23 Dec. 1596 (ibid., SP 63/196/31(VII)); Memorandum by Captain Stafford, 
May 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(2)/54); Lee, ‘Apologie’, f. 34. 
12 Moryson, Shakespeare’s Europe, p. 204. 
13 Ibid.  Moryson held the same opinion of Old English and Irish military servitors: ibid., pp 205-6. 
14 For example, see Fenton to Cecil, 20 Apr. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(2)/16); unknown to Fenton, 18 Apr. 
1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(2)/16(I)). 
15 Unfortunately, due to the lack of evidence concerning specific conspiracies and persons, very few cases 
of secret treasons may be drawn from existing official records. 
16 See, for example, Hiram Morgan, ‘Faith and fatherland or Queen and country?’ in Dúiche Néill, ix 
(1994), pp 1-49; James Perrott, The Chronicle of Ireland, 1584-1608, ed. Herbert Wood (Dublin, 1933), pp 
156-7. 
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That summer, O’Neill’s formidable Old English associate, Captain Richard Tyrrell, 
had been successfully campaigning and raising support in parts of Leinster and 
Munster.17  In August, the crown army, under the leadership of Marshal Henry Bagenal, 
suffered an embarrassing defeat at the Yellow Ford, leaving the army weakened and the 
country vulnerable.18  The rebels pressed their advantage over the following months; 
raids and spoliation were reported everywhere, but more disconcerting was that these 
incursions were occurring within a few miles of Dublin city with no perceivable 
resistance made by the inhabitants.19  Even more worrisome was that most of the 
fortifications lost to the enemy ‘were betrayed by some of the Irish, whome the owners 
did specyally trust … either norished vp by the owners from their cradle, or otherwaies 
tyed to them by many benefits’.20  Then, in October, the same month that the Munster 
plantation was overthrown, a major rebel plot to seize Dublin Castle was foiled on the 
eve of its execution.21  This was confirmation that rebel conspiracies had entered the seat 
and heart of English jurisdiction.  Meanwhile, in neighbouring County Kildare, 
unverifiable allegations had been made against William Fitzgerald, the great Earl of 
Kildare, and suspicions of rebel collusion by the habitually loyal James Fitzpiers 
Fitzgerald, sheriff of Kildare, would become legitimate.   
 
II 
 
                                                
17 Clifford to Burghley, 22 Jan. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(1)/28); extracts of a letter to Fenton, 20 Jul. 1598 
(ibid., SP 63/202(2)/110(I)); Perrott, Chronicle of Ireland, ed. Wood, p. 144; K. W. Nicholls, ‘Richard 
Tyrrell, soldier extraordinary’ in Hiram Morgan (ed.), The Battle of Kinsale (Bray, 2004), pp 161-78. 
18 See, Cyril Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish wars (London, 1996), pp 213-29; G. A. Hayes-McCoy, Irish battles 
(Belfast, 2009), pp 106-31. 
19 Ormond to Privy Council, 21 Oct. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/117); Norreys to privy council, 23 Oct. 
1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(3)/124); lords justices and Irish council to privy council, 3 Nov. 1598 (ibid., SP 
63/202(3)/142); Captain Thomas Reade to Cecil, 20 Nov. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(3)/167); Thomas Reade to 
Cecil, 1 Dec. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/3); Garrison Plot by Reade, n.d. (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/19(I)); Fenton 
to Cecil, 22 Dec. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/40); Ja[mes] Foxe to [Robert Devereaux], Earl of Essex, 9 Nov. 
1598 (H.M.C., Salisbury MSS, viii, (London, 1899), p. 433). 
20 Lords justices and Irish council to privy council, 23 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168). 
21 Loftus, Gardener, Bingham and Irish council to privy council, 31 Oct. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/135). 
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Descending from the ‘bastard’ lineage of MacThomas, James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald 
of Ballyshannon, County Kildare, was the chief of Ireland’s ‘Bastard Geraldines’.  By the 
close of the sixteenth century this lineage had become independent of the Fitzgerald earls 
of Kildare; Fitzpiers, however, seems to have maintained relatively close relations with 
the earls.22  As chief of the ‘Bastard Geraldines’, Fitzpiers held superior command over 
all his kinsmen and their retainers, which made him a man of rather significant military 
strength.  Unfortunately, little is known about Fitzpiers’ participation in the early stages 
of the Nine Years’ War; between 1594 and 1597 the Irish state papers contain only a few 
notes on his activities and affairs.  This is not altogether surprising since Fitzpiers was not 
a man of English-style title and, although he held office as sheriff of Kildare for a period, 
he did not hold office in the crown’s Irish administration or army.  But, in November 
1598, and for several months following, Fitzpiers’s name appeared regularly in official 
correspondence and contemporary discourses.  This was not because of any notable 
action against the rebels; instead, suspected of duplicitous dealings, Fitzpiers had come to 
represent the most worrisome kind of Old Englishman: the ‘secret traitor’.  As a result, 
Fitzpiers became the subject of a much debated and complicated state investigation.  Yet, 
as the case began to unravel, it seemed impossible to classify his treasonous personality 
or diagnose the exact motivation for his depraved actions; in fact, Fitzpiers’s case could 
hardly have been more complicated.      
Fitzpiers presents a very interesting subject for a study of Old English loyalties, not 
least of all because of the ambiguity surrounding his religious persuasions.  Unlike so 
many other Old English loyalists, there is no evidence with which to confirm Fitzpiers’s 
religious allegiances, though it has been suggested that his father, Sir Piers Fitzjames 
Fitzgerald, had conformed to the Protestant church.23  It is unclear whether Fitzpiers 
followed his father’s example, but nowhere in the state papers is there any reference to 
                                                
22 I am extremely grateful to Kenneth Nicholls for providing me with much valuable genealogical 
information on Fitzpiers’s lineage.  
23 Philip O’Sullivan Beare declared Piers Fitzjames, identified as Peter Fitzgerald, ‘a heretic’: O’Sullivan 
Beare, Chapters towards a history of Ireland, ed. M. J. Byrne (London, 1970), p. 75. See also Walter 
FitzGerald, ‘Walter Reagh Fitz Gerald, a noted outlaw of the sixteenth century’ in R.S.A.I.Jn., fifth series, 
viii, no. 4 (Dec. 1898), p. 302.   
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him as a recusant, a typically Old English defect which rarely escaped official 
comment.24  The possibility of an association with the established church would set 
Fitzpiers apart from the majority of Old Englishmen for whom we have records because 
the wide-spread religious dissidence of his community was one of the greatest 
contributing factors to government doubts and criticisms.  If Fitzpiers was indeed a 
member of the state church, Dublin administrators would have been more inclined to 
consider his crown loyalty relatively secure.  What is more, Fitzpiers had a family history 
of crown service.  While his father’s activities against the crown’s Gaelic Irish enemies 
had earned him the enmity of men like Catholic historian Philip O’Sullivan Beare, the 
protestant clergyman and chronicler Meredith Hanmer applauded Piers Fitzjames as ‘a 
worthie knight & faithfull subiect vnto her Maiestie’.25  Given his familial background 
and probable religious conformity, it seems only natural that Fitzpiers would side with 
the crown during the Nine Years’ War.  But, Fitzpiers also had a genuine personal motive 
for seeking the defeat of the Queen’s Irish enemies: revenge.  In March 1594, Fitzpiers’ 
father, mother, sister, and three other female relations had been killed when his father’s 
castle at Athy, Co. Kildare, was attacked and burned.26  The raid was led by Walter 
Reagh Fitzgerald and the sons of Feagh McHugh O’Byrne – who would shortly thereafter 
act as allies of O’Neill in Leinster – and was supposedly in retaliation for one committed 
against Walter Reagh.  But, the attack on Fitzpiers’ family could hardly be considered a 
fair fight since Fitzjames had been caught unawares in his own household full, not of 
martial men, but of gentlewomen.27  Thus, Fitzpiers, like so many other good sons, was 
determined to avenge the brutal murder of his father and family.28   
                                                
24 Many official recommendations for local supplicants usually made some comment to infer that the 
individual was either a recusant or ‘forward in religion’.    
25 O’Sullivan Beare maintained that the state had rewarded Piers Fitzjames’s savagery against the Gaelic 
Irish with a magistracy: O’Sullivan Beare, Chapters towards a history of Ireland, p. 75; Dr Meredith 
Hanmer to Burghley, 23 Mar. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/173/94). 
26 Complaint of James Fitzgerald, 18 Mar. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/173/91(VI)); Hanmer to Burghley, 23 Mar. 
1594 (ibid., SP 63/173/94). 
27 Generations of conflict had resulted in similar strikes and counter-strikes between the Old English and 
their Gaelic Irish neighbours. It would be impossible to prove that this was as unprovoked assault; 
according to O’Sullivan Beare, Piers Fitzjames had brought this on himself since Walter Reagh only sought 
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In his mission to settle this personal score Fitzpiers joined with his uncle, Edward 
Fitzgerald,29 in petitioning the crown and administration for assistance.30  Edward 
Fitzgerald impressed upon Lord Treasurer Burghley the precariousness of their situation, 
insisting that ‘we are in dayly danger of our lives threatned by those myschivous rebells, 
and that we haue many secrete enymyes that be our neighbours’.31  Together, they 
described the heinous event and requested auxiliary manpower from the government in 
order to avenge this wrong.32  In doing so, Fitzpiers and his uncle were also careful to 
present their case not solely as one of personal vendetta, but as one which would 
ultimately advance the crown, swearing that ‘we doe not desire our charges only to 
deffend our selues but in hope to doe her Maiestie service or to lose our lives...and by the 
grace of god there is not any towe in Ireland with so muche companie that shall doe 
better service then we shall doe’.33  Given Fitzpiers’s prior record of fidelity and service, 
the English privy council responded by directing its Irish counterpart to grant him 
command over twenty-five horse and fifty foot.34  But, as Fitzpiers and his uncle later 
explained to Burghley and Sir Robert Cecil, the grant had not materialised and they 
requested that further letters be directed to the Irish Council so that Fitzpiers ‘may haue 
                                                                                                                                            
retribution for earlier attack committed against him: O’Sullivan Beare, Chapters towards a history of 
Ireland, p. 75. For comments on petty border feuds, see, ‘An Abstracte of mysorders and evill rule within 
the lande of Ireland’ (B.L., Add. MS 48,017, ff 164-165b). It appears that Walter Reagh sustained injuries 
during this attack and he was soon captured by the authorities and hanged at Dublin: Richard Bagwell, 
Ireland under the Tudors (3vols., London, 1885-90), iii, 246-7. 
28 Complaint of James Fitzgerald, 18 Mar. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/173/91(VI)); Fitzgerald to Cecil, 2 Sep. 
1594 (ibid., SP 63/176/3). 
29 Fitzpiers’ mother was the sister of Edward Fitzgerald. It is possible that this Edward Fitzgerald was the 
same Edward who served as the Earl of Kildare’s steward in Lecale. 
30 James Fitzgerald to Cecil, 2 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/176/3); petition of Edward Fitzgerald, 2 Sep. 1594 
(ibid., SP 63/176/4); William Smythe to Burghley, 25 Jan. 1595 (ibid., SP 63/178/20). 
31 Petition of Edward Fitzgerald, 2 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/176/4). 
32 Complaint of James Fitzgerald, 18 Mar. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/173/91(VI)); Petition of Edward Fitzgerald, 
2 Sep. 1594 (ibid., SP 63/176/4). 
33 Petition of Edward Fitzgerald, 2 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/176/4). 
34 These forces were to be raised within Ireland: James Fitzgerald to Cecil, 2 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 
63/176/3). 
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the saide number of horsmen to be, by me Imploide in service, againste the murderers of 
my parentes’.35  It would seem, based on the cessation of their appeals and various muster 
reports, that Fitzpiers and his uncle were successful in this suit.     
After this spate of petitions, and a report that Fitzpiers had delivered three rebel 
heads to the administration in April 1595, Fitzpiers cannot be tracked in state records for 
the next two years.36  But, in April 1597, Fitzpiers was singled out for special praise 
when Lord Deputy Russell informed the English privy council that Captain Thomas 
Lee’s company had recently slain the rebel James Butler, along with some of his 
company, and that Fitzpiers had ‘lighted vpon divers other of the rest of them’.37  
Russell’s personal military journal also noted that Fitzpiers had ‘sent in 13 of the traytors 
heades’ on 5 April and, the following month, had ‘sent into Dubline one other of Hugh 
Cantoes (sic) sonnes, whom he tooke prisoner’.38  This was an impressive record of 
service and the crown showed obvious appreciation by rewarding Fitzpiers with 66s. 8d. 
for the delivery of rebel heads.39   
After this, Fitzpiers disappears from the records again only to resurface a year and a 
half later under very different circumstances.  By mid-November 1598 the Dublin 
administration was in possession of a subversive communication sent to Fitzpiers by the 
archenemy Hugh O’Neill the previous March.40  In it, O’Neill appealed to Fitzpiers’s 
sense of patriotic duty in the most uncompromising terms while, simultaneously, preying 
upon Fitzpiers’s vulnerable position within Ireland’s factional political system and 
directly threatening Fitzpiers’s personal security.  Provocative though it was, it is unlikely 
that O’Neill’s appeal to Fitzpiers provided the real impetus for subsequent events; that, 
                                                
35 Ibid.; petition of Edward Fitzgerald, 2 Sep. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/176/4). 
36 ‘My L[ord]s Iournall begining on Midsomer daye the 24th of June 1595’ (Lambeth Palace Library, Carew 
MSS, vol. 612, no. 270), hereafter cited as Russell’s Journal. 
37 Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 6 Apr. 1597 (T.N.A., SP 63/198/69). 
38 Russell’s journal (Lambeth Palace Library, Carew MS 612/270). 
39 ‘Several books of payments made by the Treasurer at Wars’, 13 Mar. 1599 (T.N.A., SP 63/203/76). 
40 O’Neill to James Fitzpiers, 11 Mar. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168(II)). This letter was part of an 
enclosure sent from the Irish council to the privy council on 23 Nov., 1598. It is unclear when the state 
came to possess O’Neill’s communication; however, since there is no prior mention of this letter, it is 
assumed that they had only acquired it very recently.  
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however, does not mean the ideology or conditions behind it should be discounted.  
Indeed, within a month of the letter’s discovery, the Earl of Ormond had informed the 
Privy Council that Fitzpiers ‘hath moste traytourouslye revolted’.41  
 
III 
 
Soon after entering rebellion, Hugh O’Neill, the charismatic leader of the Irish 
Catholic confederacy, had begun stressing the common bonds of religion and native land 
in order to motivate the Old English to join the Gaelic Irish in a fight against foreign 
heresy.42  From an early date, the Dublin administration had expressed concerns about the 
probable success of O’Neill’s proselytisers and his increasingly sophisticated propaganda 
machine; but the danger of his persuasions amongst the otherwise loyal population of the 
Pale became fully apparent when O’Neill’s intrigues with Fitzpiers were revealed in 
November 1598.  O’Neill’s letter to Fitzpiers is one of the most advanced and concise 
appeals to an individual’s sense of patriotic duty surviving from this period, but it is also 
proof that O’Neill tailored his propaganda to suit his audience.43   
Given the uncertainty over Fitzpiers’s religious allegiances, it is interesting to note 
that the ‘faith’ aspect in O’Neill’s letter was carefully worded.  Although he invoked the 
name of God, His ‘Commaundements’, referred to Heaven and Hell, and even employed 
the term ‘converte’ twice, O’Neill made no specific reference to the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Pope, or ‘Christ’s true religion’.  And, while the demand to ‘converte’ was 
undoubtedly religiously motivated, in the context of this letter it seems to be Fitzpiers’s 
general behaviour, in both political and religious matters, which needed reform.  Indeed, 
when compared to O’Neill’s communications with other Irish lords, like those of 
                                                
41 Ormond to Privy Council, 17 Dec. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(4)/34); list of gentlemen, 14 Dec. 1598 
(ibid., SP 63/202(4)/26). 
42 Hiram Morgan, ‘Policy and propaganda in Hugh O’Neill’s connection with Europe’ in Thomas 
O’Connor and Mary Ann Lyons (eds), The Ulster earls and baroque Europe (Dublin, 2010), pp 18-52. 
43 O’Neill to James Fitzpiers, 11 Mar. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202 (3)/168 (II)).  See also Ruth Canning, ‘War, 
identity, and the Pale: the Old English and the 1590s crisis in Ireland’ (Ph.D. thesis, University College 
Cork, 2012).  Hiram Morgan has also identified the significance of the letter in O’Neill’s conception of 
fatherland ideology: Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill and the Nine Years War’, pp 21-37. 
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Munster, the letter to Fitzpiers does not explicitly present itself as plea for a Catholic 
crusade; instead, O’Neill appears to be placing greater emphasis on Fitzpiers’s patriotic 
duty to defend his native soil: the fatherland.44  As an Old Englishman, born and bred in 
Ireland, Fitzpiers may have felt a need to defend his patria and his position within it from 
ambitious newcomers; thus, O’Neill focussed on the fatherland and the righteousness in 
defending one’s country against foreign oppressions.  But, while this letter illustrates both 
the persuasiveness and adaptability of O’Neill’s patriotic tactics, the timing of his 
communication also seems to have been rather propitious.  Based on existing evidence, it 
might be reasonable to assume that O’Neill targeted Fitzpiers in the spring of 1598 
because he had reason to believe that Fitzpiers was open to switching teams.  Indeed, it is 
quite likely that O’Neill was aware of Fitzpiers’s personal grudge against the Queen’s 
lieutenant -general, ‘Black’ Tom, the great Earl of Ormond, and it is conceivable that he 
recognised a special opportunity to appeal to the sheriff of Kildare.   
It has been argued that the strongest impediment to the development of an Irish 
Catholic national identity during the early modern period was the island’s fragmented and 
factional political system.  Although there were exceptions, this usually meant that each 
Irish lord was so preoccupied with his own private agenda that he failed to seize 
opportunities to make common cause with others of similar interest.45  It has, however, 
been suggested that Hugh O’Neill was the first Irishman to conceive of an Irish nation 
and attempt uniting the various Irish factions through the alignment of religious and 
                                                
44 Letter by O’Neill, O’Donnell, O’Rourke and McWilliam sent into Munster, 6 Jul. 1596 (Cal. Carew 
MSS, 1589-1600, p. 179); O’Neill to David, Viscount Buttevant, Lord Barry, 25 Feb. 1600 (T.N.A., SP 
63/207(1)/130). 
45 Richard Hadsor, the Earl of Essex, and Philip O’Sullivan Beare held similar opinions, that private 
interest, rather than public duty, dictated the actions of individuals during this period.  For examples see 
‘Discourse by Richard Hadsor’ (B.L. Cotton MS Titus BX, ff 79-84); Essex to privy council, 29 Apr. 1599 
(T.N.A., SP 63/205/42); Hiram Morgan, ‘“Making Ireland Spanish”: the political writings of Philip 
O’Sullivan Beare’ in Jason Harris and Keith Sidwell (eds), Making Ireland Roman: Irish Neo-Latin writers 
and the Republic of Letters (Cork, 2009), pp 93-4, 102-6.  For a discussion of earlier violent competitions 
between factions and internal rivals, see David Edwards, ‘The escalation of violence in sixteenth-century 
Ireland’ in David Edwards, Pádraig Lenihan, and Clodagh Tait (eds), Age of atrocity: violence and political 
conflict in early modern Ireland (Dublin, 2007), pp 34-78.   
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national interests for the universal purpose of expelling the English.46  To this end, 
O’Neill kept abreast of all political matters prevailing in, and pertaining to, Ireland.47  He 
was also acutely conscious of the factional rivalries obtaining within each of Ireland’s 
prominent families, as well as those which split Ireland’s English administration.  
Throughout the preceding centuries, the English crown and its enemies had endeavoured 
to exploit the chronic and combative factionalism existing within the Irish political 
system; O’Neill recognised the same opportunity and, with some success, interfered in 
both domestic and international rivalries in order to direct these weaknesses to his own 
advantage.  Indeed, once firmly established in Ulster, O’Neill had quickly set to work 
manipulating the personal ambitions and endemic power struggles of his neighbours.48  
With the outbreak of war, O’Neill cast his eye further abroad.  He exploited existing 
feuds and attempted to create others by resorting to allegations of treachery in order to 
draw already insecure Old English lords to his side.  For example, in 1594 O’Neill made 
overtures to the Earl of Kildare.49  In doing so, he attempted to twist the details of recent 
events in his own favour by claiming that certain attacks committed against Kildare’s 
lands, supposedly perpetrated by some of O’Neill’s kinsmen and allies, had, in fact, been 
executed under the authority of Marshal Bagenal.50  And, should Kildare wish to proceed 
                                                
46 For an analysis of the historiography relating to O’Neill as a nationalist, see Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill and 
the Nine Years War’ pp 21-37.  Prominent amongst those who have portrayed O’Neill as an early 
nationalist was John Mitchel: see Mitchel, The life and times of Aodh O’Neill (Dublin, 1845). 
47 For example, see, John Morgan to Russell, 10 Jul. 1596 (TN.A., SP 63/191/18); memorandum by 
Captain Stafford, May 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(2)/54); Lee, ‘Apologie’ f. 34. 
48 For a discussion of O’Neill’s manipulation of Ulster politics, especially his elimination of competitors, 
see Hiram Morgan, ‘“Slán Dé fút go hoíche”: Hugh O’Neill’s murders’ in Edwards, Lenihan, and Tait 
(eds), Age of atrocity, pp 95-118; G. A. Hayes-McCoy, ‘Strategy and tactics in Irish warfare, 1593-1601’ in 
Irish Historical Studies, ii, no. 7 (Mar. 1941), p. 257. 
49 O’Neill to [Henry Fitzgerald,] Earl of Kildare, 8 Apr. 1594 (T.N.A., SP 63/174/37(XIII)). 
50 For an official report on these attacks on Kildare, see ‘Advertisements sent to Sir Henry Duke by several 
espials’, 20 Feb. 1595 (T.N.A., SP 63/178/53(V)).  See also ‘Advertisements delivered by Captain James 
Fitzgarrett’, 12 Aug. 1596 (ibid., SP 63/192/7(XI)).   
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against the offenders, he would find O’Neill ‘redie to performe anie thing I maie that 
shall work your contentment’.51   
O’Neill knew exactly how to play on the vulnerabilities of individuals; he knew 
Kildare was irate at the recent spoliation of his lands, and he also knew that there was no 
love lost between Bagenal and any of the Irish nobility.  In his communication with 
Kildare, circumstances had permitted O’Neill to attempt to shift the blame from his own 
adherents to his personal nemesis, Bagenal.  It would, however, be much more difficult to 
excuse himself and his allies for their cruelty to Fitzpiers’s father.  But, try he did.  
O’Neill claimed that the former cruelty of Fitzpiers’s father had justified his murder and, 
since it was believed Fitzpiers shared his father’s bloody temperament, the sheriff was 
undeserving of any courteous communication.  Yet, according to O’Neill, the 
confederates had not lost hope that Fitzpiers would reform his ways, and it was at the 
behest of Piers Fitzjames’s murderers that O’Neill now extended this kindly entreaty.  
For the same reason, the Leinster confederates had abstained from assaulting Fitzpiers as 
of yet; but O’Neill was obliged to warn him that if he did not acquiesce now, his failure 
to perform his natural duty to his country would not go unpunished.  Indeed, if Fitzpiers 
did not heed their gracious and well-intended warning he could expect to suffer the same 
fate as his father.  This letter is indicative of O’Neill’s astute manipulation of events; by 
twisting the cause of the earlier attack on Fitzpiers’s father by men who had since 
become his confirmed allies, O’Neill attempted to convert a detrimental event into one of 
opportunity.  But of equal importance is that this combination of patriotic ideology and 
physical threat was directed towards Fitzpiers at a time when he was at odds with the 
most powerful man in Ireland’s English executive.  
 
IV 
 
                                                
51 O’Neill to Kildare, 8 Apr. 1594 (TNA, SP 63/174/37(XIII)).  See also ‘Advertisements delivered by 
Captain James Fitzgarrett’, 12 Aug. 1596 (ibid., SP 63/192/7(XI)). Fortunately for Kildare, following the 
discovery of O’Neill’s letter Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam assured Burghley that there was no reason to doubt 
the earl: Fitzwilliam to Burghley, 5 May 1594 (ibid., SP 63/174/38). 
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Receiving a seditious letter from O’Neill and acting on it were two separate 
matters.  But, at the end of November, eight months after the date of O’Neill’s 
communication, Sir Richard Bingham, the recently appointed Marshal of Ireland, notified 
the Lords Justices that Fitzpiers had suddenly revolted.  According to Bingham, 
immediately after his men had delivered fresh supplies into the crown ward at the Abbey 
of Athy, the constable, Collier, surrendered it ‘vpon frendlie composicion’ to James 
Fitzpiers.52  Bingham noted that Fitzpiers had recently written to him to explain that, as 
sheriff of Kildare, he had taken personal control of the ward in order to better serve the 
Queen.  However, once in command, Fitzpiers had handed the fortification over to the 
infamous rebel Owny McRory O’Moore and, in addition to the actual building, the 
former ward, along with ‘14 more, all Englishe’, defected to the rebels at Fitzpiers’s 
supposed urging.53  Bingham was infuriated that crown soldiers, ‘well furnished, and able 
to haue kept the Abbey for a tyme against all the rebelles in theis partes,’ had so quickly 
capitulated to the enemy.54  But far more confounding to Bingham was that ‘Englishmen 
become traitors amongst these Yrishe rebelles’.55  The sheriff’s suspicious dealings 
continued.  After relinquishing the abbey to Owny, Fitzpiers continued to hold another 
ward in the castle on the bridge in Athy which he refused to redeliver to crown officers.56  
Rather than employing himself to the Queen’s advantage, Fitzpiers blocked the passage 
of crown troops and supply convoys at the bridge, seriously impeding the government’s 
ability to victual other crown fortifications in the vicinity.57  To make matters worse, soon 
after securing this fortification, Fitzpiers marched into Munster ‘with the Dempsies, O 
                                                
52 Bingham complained that ‘Collier the constable was maried to one of the Moores, and by that meanes as 
it shold seeme, was the castilier drawne to be a villaine’, Bingham to Loftus and Gardener, 27 Nov. 1598 
(T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/172). 
53 Once in possession of the building, Owny McRory proceeded to tear it down: ibid.; Ormond to privy 
council, 17 Dec. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/34). 
54 Bingham to Loftus and Gardener, 27 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/172). 
55 Ibid. 
56 Reade to Cecil, 1 Dec. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(4)/3). 
57 Ormond to privy council, 17 Dec. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(4)/34). 
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Duns, and Ownie MrRowries’, but failing to win any ground in Munster, Fitzpiers and 
his new allies returned to Kildare where they pestered and spoiled the Queen’s subjects.58   
Although administrators may have sounded surprised by these events, it seems that 
many suspected trouble had been brewing in County Kildare for some time.  In early 
November 1598, presumably before O’Neill’s communication with Fitzpiers became 
known, the Irish council was already deeply suspicious about ‘a greate personage in 
Leinster’.59  A few days later Bingham affirmed that ‘[w]e h[e]are many likelihoods that 
some of the great ones in the Pale will ere it be longe showe openlie in this accion’.60  
This great person seems to have been the Earl of Kildare, but Fenton dismissed 
suspicions, insisting that ‘I see not how by breakinge his duty he cann better his estate, 
but rather make it desperate for euer’.61  But, in addition to the earl, administrators must 
have had some particular doubts about the sheriff of Kildare because they had already 
ordered James Fitzpiers, along with the rest of the gentlemen of Kildare, to appear before 
the council on 6 November 1598.  As sheriff, Fitzpiers claimed to have obeyed these 
instructions by dispatching warrants to the sergeants of each barony; however, none of 
the men summoned from County Kildare, including Fitzpiers and the earl, presented 
themselves before the council.62  Their explanations seemed weak.  The earl protested 
that he had suddenly fallen ill and was unable to endure the journey to Dublin.63  
Fitzpiers offered the same excuse, to which he would soon add several others.  In fact, 
according to Fitzpiers, the strongest reason for his non-attendance related to Captain 
Thomas Lee and the earl of Ormond.64  
                                                
58 Bingham to Loftus and Gardener, 27 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/172); ‘The greevances of the 
Englishe Pale’ 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/60). 
59 Loftus, Gardener, Bingham and Irish council to privy council, 31 Oct. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/135); 
lords justices and Irish council to privy council, 3 Nov. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(3)/142). 
60 Bingham to Cecil, 6 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/150). 
61 Fenton to Cecil, 5 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/147). 
62 James Fitzpiers to Loftus and Gardener, 18 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168(III)); Loftus and 
Gardener and Fenton to privy council, 7 Nov. 1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(3)/152). 
63 Kildare to Loftus and Gardener, 7 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/152(II)); Foxe to Essex, 9 Nov. 1598 
(H.M.C., Salisbury MSS, viii, p. 433). 
64 James Fitzpiers to Loftus and Gardener, 18 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168(III)). 
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In the years preceding his defection, a close friendship had developed between 
Fitzpiers and Captain Lee.  As neighbours in Athy, County Kildare, they had served 
alongside each other on numerous campaigns against the Queen’s Irish enemies.  But 
they had also bonded over common hatred for Thomas Butler, the earl of Ormond, and it 
appears the feeling was mutual.  Lee had earned the earl’s enmity as early as 1581 after 
allowing his horse company to run amok in Ormond’s territory; henceforth the two men 
missed few opportunities to frustrate one another, either through accusations of 
fraudulent behaviour or by trespassing upon one another’s property.65  Although the 
source of antagonism between Ormond and Fitzpiers is less clear, it does appear that 
Ormond harboured a particular dislike for James Fitzpiers since Captain Lee declared that 
the recently appointed lieutenant-general hated Fitzpiers ‘as he hates the dyvell’.66   
It would seem that fear of Ormond and solidarity with Lee greatly influenced 
Fitzpiers’s conduct in late 1598.  Shortly after Fitzpiers failed to appear before the Irish 
council, his friend Lee had been committed to Dublin Castle for his invention of a 
convoluted conspiracy to solve the Irish crisis.  Fitzpiers complained that if Lee, ‘being a 
man of good desert’, had been imprisoned, then he had good reason to expect the same 
fate considering he was ‘ioyned with him [Lee] in all his actions’.67  Fitzpiers further 
argued that he could hardly expect fair or lenient treatment at the hands of a government 
overseen by his avowed enemy, insisting that had he ventured to Dublin, Ormond would 
                                                
65 John McGurk, ‘Hugh Ó Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone & Captain Thomas Lee, double-agent’ in Dúiche Néill, 
xv (2006), p. 13; Hiram Morgan, ‘Tom Lee: the posing peacemaker’ in Brendan Bradshaw, Andrew 
Hadfield, and Willy Maley (eds), Representing Ireland: literature and the origins of conflict, 1534-1660 
(Cambridge, 1993), pp 145, 158; ‘Substance of speeches between Captain Lee and Richard Hoper’, 24 
Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/171(IV)). 
66 Ibid.  It is possible that there may have been an inheritance dispute between Fitzpiers and Ormond since 
they were distant relations. I am grateful to Kenneth Nicholls for pointing out this genealogical link. 
Similarly, Richard Bagwell indicated a genealogical connection between Fitzpiers’ family and the earl of 
Ormond, stating that Fitzpiers’ father was a ‘kinsman’ to the earl: Bagwell, Ireland under the Tudors, iii, 
246. 
67 James Fitzpiers to Loftus and Gardener, 18 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168(III)). 
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have ordered the council ‘to leave me vpp, and to breake my necke’.68  The Irish council 
paid little heed to these excuses and referred Fitzpiers’s letter, along with the one from 
O’Neill, to the English privy council so that ‘your Lordships may see, by what sleight 
evasions he shonneth to come to vs’.69   
Nevertheless, Fitzpiers’s revolt did surprise some English administrators.  One such 
officer was muster-master Sir Ralph Lane who contended that Fitzpiers, like his father 
before him, had spent ‘his wholle life vntill fewe weekes paste, not onelie loyall, but in 
vallor moste serviceable to her maiestie euen againste his owne bloode’.70  Bearing in 
mind Fitzpiers’s former reliability, it was believed that this betrayal might have been 
triggered by some internal discord within the loyalist camp rather than personal 
inconstancy.  Indeed, Lane attributed Fitzpiers’s change of heart to desperation because 
he was ‘firste depressed, and now hedlonge thruste out into rebellion by my Lord 
Liftenants knowne displeasure towards him’.71  Captain Thomas Read shared this 
opinion, explaining to Sir Robert Cecil that Fitzpiers, being ‘a man of good service, is not 
favowred by my Lord generall, and feareth muche the burthen of his honors displeasure.  
And it is to be supposed that he wilbe vppon his guarde and that duringe the tyme of my 
L. generalls aucthoritie he will neyther truste my L. generall nor the State’.72  While it is 
conceivable that these English officers felt genuine sympathy for Fitzpiers’s predicament, 
it is equally possible that they were inclined to favour Fitzpiers on account of the 
widespread jealousy and resentment many English administrators harboured against the 
powerful Earl of Ormond.  Prominent amongst this kind of officer was Captain Thomas 
Lee who, determined to undermine Ormond’s authority and expose him as a traitor, 
enlisted the assistance of Fitzpiers in an elaborate and dangerous plot. 
 
V 
                                                
68 Ibid.  His friend Lee was of the same opinion, stating that if Fitzpiers ever ventured to meet Ormond, the 
earl ‘would surely hang’ him: ‘Substance of speeches between Captain Lee and Hoper’, 24 Nov. 1598 
(ibid., SP 63/202(3)/171(IV)). 
69 Lords justices and Irish council to privy council, 23 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/168). 
70 Sir Ralph Lane’s project for service, 23 Dec. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(4)/46(I)). 
71 Ibid. 
72 Reade to Cecil, 20 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/167). 
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Evidence showing Fitzpiers to be in collusion with the Queen’s enemies was 
damning.  He had received a seditious letter from O’Neill; he had refused to appear 
before the Irish Council; he had seized control of crown fortifications which he then 
delivered to known rebels; and he had participated in rebel forays against the Queen’s 
subjects.  But while Ormond and the council were expressing concerns over Fitzpiers’s 
recent defection, a case was being made which suggested that the Old Englishman’s 
actions were more loyal than anyone could have imagined.  Indeed, interrogatories 
administered to Captain Thomas Lee implied that Fitzpiers was involved in some top-
secret plot which, while casting him in the role of traitor for the moment, would 
ultimately give the crown the upper hand.   
According to Captain Lee, Fitzpiers was a principal participant in his recently 
devised scheme to topple Ireland’s greatest secret traitor and subdue the rebellion 
currently raging throughout the country.  Lee was not the only man to formulate an 
elaborate proposal for the suppression of O’Neill’s rebellion, but his was unique in that it 
flirted with treason and jeopardised the loyalty of James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald.73  A 
controversial character who authored numerous complaints and proposals, as well as 
three significant treatises on Ireland, Lee showed no reservations about attacking high-
ranking administrators with his pen.74  Naturally, this did not bode well for his 
professional or private advancement; and, while accusations against fellow army and 
administrative officers made for powerful enemies, his own affairs offered his adversaries 
much to criticise.  Over the course of his Irish career Lee had participated in both 
authorised and unsanctioned discussions with the Queen’s Irish enemies and, in doing so, 
he had made some unsavoury friends, amongst whom may be counted Hugh O’Neill.75  
                                                
73 For example, Lee’s plot can be compared to another proposal drafted by Sir Ralph Lane around the same 
time: Lane to Cecil, 23 Dec. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(4)/46); Sir Ralph Lane’s project for service, 23 Dec. 
1598 (ibid., SP 63/202(4)/46(I)).  
74 Lee, ‘Infformacion giuen to Queen Elizabeth against Sir William Fitzwilliams, his gouernmente in 
Irelande’ (c. 1594), ed. Hiram Morgan, (www.celt.ie/history) (12 June 2011); Lee, ‘A brief declaration of 
the government of Ireland’ (1594), in John Lodge (ed.), Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica (2 vols., Dublin, 
1772), i, 87-150; Lee, ‘Discovery and Recovery of Ireland with the Author’s Apology’. 
75 Morgan, ‘Tom Lee’, pp 132-65. 
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On account of his long familiarity with many confederate leaders, Lee believed that he 
could orchestrate a more peaceful solution for Ireland; this, however, provided his 
opponents with the necessary fodder to present treasonous allegations which landed Lee 
in prison on several occasions.  Indeed, in November 1595 Lee was detained on Sir 
Henry Harrington’s complaints and, in February 1598, he was committed again after 
Captain Charles Montague accused him of ‘maynteyning & adhering to the Byrnes & 
other Rebells of Leinster, & in some sort coherent to the rebells of Ulster’.76  Harrington 
supported Montague’s charges, but they received far more influential backing from the 
earl of Ormond with the result that Lee spent the following five months in Dublin 
Castle.77  
Following his release in July 1598, Lee was determined to discover how he could 
undermine his nemesis, Ormond, while settling Ireland once and for all.  He returned to 
his home in Athy and immediately set to work investigating affairs in the area by 
conversing with his ‘honest frends’ as well as ‘divers traytors’.  The accumulated 
information led Lee to conclude that the Queen was ‘merely cosoned of her Kingdome of 
Ireland, which was to be betrayed, even by those, in whome her Highnes did repose the 
most trust’.78  The ‘procurer of all these trubles’, and ‘author of this rebellion’, Lee 
declared, was the earl of Ormond, now lieutenant-general of the Queen’s army in 
Ireland.79  In other words, the Queen’s most trusted Irish servitor was in fact the chief of 
the ‘secret traitors’.  Lee reckoned that uncovering the earl’s treasonous dealings and 
overthrowing his paramountcy would facilitate a successful and lasting pacification of 
                                                
76 Sir Charles Calthorpe, attorney-general of Ireland, to Burghley, 28 Mar. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(I)/94). 
77 This article outlines only one of Lee’s many ambitious and controversial projects.  His career and 
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78 Lee, ‘Apologie’ f. 15. 
79 An act of Council, 14 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 63/202(3)/171(I)). 
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Ireland.  But, because only he and a few others seemed to understand the urgency, Lee 
had resolved to take it upon himself to expose Ormond’s treasons and extinguish the 
pestilent Irish rebellion. 
Without a doubt, Lee was an ambitious man who felt that his intellect and many 
skills were grossly undervalued by his superiors, and it would seem that he was on a 
constant mission to prove just that.  On 13 November 1598, a confident Captain Lee met 
with Thomas Jones, bishop of Meath, and disclosed his plans for defeating the Queen’s 
Irish enemies.80  He began by laying bare his feelings about Ormond and the need to 
expose the earl’s treasons, but he declined Jones’s request that he share the grounds of his 
suspicions or the details of his plot with the Irish council, insisting that the success of his 
scheme depended on its secrecy.  Given the substance of Lee’s accusations and the 
perilous nature of his plot, Jones felt duty bound to relate the content of their 
conversation to the rest of the council and, the following day, Lee was brought before the 
council where he was required to explain himself.81   
When asked the grounds for his allegations against Ormond, Lee exclaimed ‘by 
Iesu God, they are to[o] manifest’.82  He asserted that O’Neill had personally confessed to 
being ‘wholy’ dependent upon Ormond prior to his rebellion and that he still ‘must nedes 
be directed by him’.83  Similarly, the notorious rebel Brian Reagh Fitzgerald had bragged 
to Lee that ‘you thinke he is on your side, but by god he is on our side’.84  Brian Reagh 
further claimed that O’Neill and Ormond had agreed to divide Ireland between them 
following the expected overthrow of English government – O’Neill ruling everything 
                                                
80 Report of certain speeches between Lee and Thomas Jones, bishop of Meath, 18 Nov. 1598 (T.N.A., SP 
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north of the Boyne and Ormond controlling all territory south of it.85  To help substantiate 
the alleged alliance, Lee drew attention to how few rebel raids had been committed 
against Ormond’s territory compared to the rest of the country, insisting that while the 
rest of Ireland was utterly impoverished and virtually devoid of decent livestock, 
Ormond’s ‘country swarmes with them, and hath had fewe or none taken from him of 
long tyme’.86  Moreover, Lee had it on good authority that when Brian Reagh’s followers 
did commit some spoils against Ormond, O’Neill had personally intervened and ordered 
the restitution of all preys.87  As further proof of rebel collusion, Lee offered Ormond’s 
recent inactivity as lieutenant-general.  He argued that since taking command of the 
crown army Ormond had drawn all available forces into Kilkenny for the preservation of 
his own territories where they performed no notable service against easily confronted 
neighbouring rebels.88  By this act Ormond had weakened Pale defences, leaving it at the 
mercy of the Queen’s enemies who had immediately attacked the borders and tormented 
her unprotected subjects.  In addition to this, Lee accused Ormond of inciting loyal 
subjects to rebel, including some of his own kinsmen.89  Worse still, Lee contended that 
Ormond had attempted to turn the earl of Kildare through speeches intended ‘to provoke 
him & to breede a discontentment in him, viz., that bothe himselfe & he the sayd Earle of 
Kildare, beinge noble men, had bene vnworthely vsed by the Lords Iustices & not as men 
of theyre sorte should have bene’.90  According to Lee, Kildare had only been stayed 
through the intervention of himself and his friend James Fitzpiers.91  It is possible, 
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however, that Lee had exaggerated their influence in this respect since, several weeks 
earlier, secretary Fenton had already dispelled fears about Kildare’s possible teetering.92  
Much of what Lee had to say about Ormond’s self-preservation during this war 
seems to be borne out by other accounts.93  But Ormond had many enemies in the Irish 
administration and amongst his Old English peers, many of whom were only too willing 
to entertain accusations of double-dealing by the earl.  As a result, Ormond had 
weathered many a political storm and his supposed security may have been due to 
prudence and his own vigilant care.94  Indeed, while drawing away large numbers of 
crown soldiers for the protection of his own territory was almost certainly selfishly 
motivated, it can be argued that if Ormond had been in league with O’Neill he would not 
have felt any need to do so.  Furthermore, the Baron of Delvin had uncovered a rebel 
conspiracy to seize the town of Kilkenny with the collusion of some its less reliable 
inhabitants, thus indicating that the earl was not entirely immune to rebel scheming.95  
Nevertheless, there may be some truth to O’Neill’s cautious dealings, but mainly because 
it was in O’Neill’s best interests to avoid causing any offence to the great earl.  Although 
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the Queen’s cousin and one of her court favourites, Ormond was a powerful Irish lord in 
his own right and the fall of crown government would not change that fact.  Should the 
rebels be victorious, O’Neill would still have to reach some sort of accommodation with 
the Earl if he was to make any permanent settlement in an independent Ireland, and this 
would be exponentially more difficult if Ormond felt personally affronted by O’Neill.  
Although Ormond must have been conscious of this, under the English crown he was the 
greatest man in Ireland and it was unlikely he would hazard that by conspiring with the 
Queen’s enemies.  Nevertheless, the fact that the Irish council was willing to mull over 
Lee’s allegations is indicative of the suspicion with which they held all Old English 
servitors and the jealousy they bore towards Ormond in particular.   
Having justified his reasons for targeting Ormond, Lee was then required to explain 
how he intended to execute his plot.  He had bragged to Jones that he could gather and 
command a force of five thousand but, under interrogation, Lee maintained that he had 
not actually discussed his plans with anyone except ‘that honest Iames ffitzPiers, who is 
as sure to the State, as any in the kingdome’.96  Nevertheless, Lee remained confident that 
when the time for action was upon them he would find ready assistance amongst the 
nobility of the Pale, Leinster, and Munster.97  This may have been a reasonable 
assumption since the Irish nobility owed fealty to the English crown, at least in theory; 
but Lee also hoped to collude with known rebels, namely Donnell Spaniagh, Owny 
McRory, Phelim McFeagh, the O’Moores, the O’Dempseys, and the Viscount 
Mountgarrett.98  To most, gaining the co-operation of so many groups must have seemed 
unlikely, yet Lee did not think this impractical, presumably as long as he played to anti-
Ormondist sentiments.  Lee also believed rebel complicity could be partially achieved 
through his own reputation and, as a further guarantee, he would employ Catholic priests 
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to ‘bring them to me, one after an other, & there priests will assure them to me by there 
booke oathes’.99  As for O’Neill, Lee planned to compass him by acquainting his 
secretary, Henry Hovenden, with the plan.100  Finally, once all arrangements were in 
place, Lee averred that he would be able to ‘drawe them as I lyste’ and ‘order them as 
pleaseth me’.101 
Lee made few excuses for his conspiracy, or for the rogue behaviour of his friend 
Fitzpiers.  From the outset Lee admitted that his scheme dictated acts of treason in order 
to achieve its end, yet he had purposefully designed it in such a way as to keep himself 
clear of any treasonous dealings with the rebels.  When asked to further qualify how he 
planned to achieve all this without being detected, Lee announced that ‘he did thinke to 
compasse them by Iames fitzpeirs’.102  The Irish council seemed taken aback by Lee’s 
plan to turn Fitzpiers, ‘a good & dutifull subiect’, into ‘the executor of your plot’, but Lee 
was quick to respond that Fitzpiers was still a paradigm of crown loyalty, even asserting 
that he was amongst the four most trustworthy crown subjects in the whole of Ireland.103  
Lee also maintained that Fitzpiers had resolutely ignored all rebel overtures, including the 
patriotic persuasions of O’Neill’s letter only six months earlier.  It was not until Lee’s 
release from prison and his investigation into Ormond’s treasons that Fitzpiers 
contemplated any such action, and it was only because the ends justified the means.  Thus 
Lee protested that Fitzpiers ‘had noe Trayterous intent’; it was, however, necessary that 
he play the part of a traitor in order to ingratiate himself with the rebels and then act as a 
double agent for the benefit of the crown.104  Fitzpiers was the ideal candidate for this 
because, as chief of the Bastard Geraldines, he could draw large numbers of kinsmen and 
retainers into rebellion whereby he would gain rebel trust and quickly infiltrate the upper 
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levels of rebel command.  Once established in confederate ranks, Fitzpiers would be able 
to relay details of rebel plans to Lee who would then provide the administration with all 
essential information.   
As far as Lee was concerned, he had come up with the answer to England’s Irish 
problem; his flirtation with treason, however, could not have come at a worse time.  
During the three months leading up to this investigation the crown had suffered a 
massively embarrassing military defeat at Yellow Ford, the Munster plantation had been 
overthrown, and a rebel plot to seize Dublin Castle had been uncovered.  What is more – 
not surprisingly – Lee had not waited for the council’s approval before plotting the 
demise of Ireland’s highest ranking officer and setting Fitzpiers to work.105  Thus, after 
some deliberation on the perilous nature of Lee’s plot and his bold allegations against 
Ormond, the Irish council decided that Lee should be confined to Dublin Castle.  This, 
however, was not the reason imparted to the public; instead, the advertised reason for 
Lee’s committal was his secondary role in pushing the otherwise loyal James Fitzpiers 
Fitzgerald into revolt.106  Although the council’s verdict could be easily justified on a 
number of points, it only served to complicate matters because Lee’s imprisonment drove 
his co-conspirator Fitzpiers to stand upon his guard, entrench himself in the castle of 
Athy, and commit to rebellion.107   
Notwithstanding these complications, Fitzpiers continued to notify the imprisoned 
Lee of all confederate developments and Lee, in turn, alerted the government.  Yet these 
opportunities were squandered by the administration.  When the mismanaged crown army 
was dispatched to encounter the enemy in accordance with these intelligences, it missed 
the times and places specified by Fitzpiers by only minutes or metres; and the 
coincidence of the army’s appearance in the vicinity gave the rebels reason to suspect that 
their movements and plans were being betrayed by one of their own.  Unsurprisingly, as 
an Old Englishman, and perhaps a Protestant, with a previously untarnished record of 
crown loyalty, Fitzpiers found himself the object of confederate scrutiny and was now 
unsure whom to trust.  Forced to decide whether he would be better off adhering to the 
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rebels or turning himself over to the government where he was sure to fall victim to the 
offended Earl of Ormond, Fitzpiers made his decision.  Although he maintained 
communications with Lee, keeping him informed of rebel affairs, Fitzpiers felt resigned 
to continue in his present action ‘because the State [had] neglected him’.108  This was 
indeed the crown’s loss because, not long after making this decision, Sir Ralph Lane 
reported that the Bastard Geraldines had appointed Fitzpiers their general and had united 
with the rest of the Leinster rebels, bringing that province’s combined rebel strength to an 
estimated ‘2,500 horsse and ffoote’ or more.109     
 
 
VI 
 
In most cases like this, men like Fitzpiers would have disappeared from official 
records, being written off as traitors who might later be killed in action or wearily submit 
to the crown on uneasy terms.  But it was not long before Fitzpiers re-evaluated his 
situation and, by the end of May 1599, he had submitted to the crown.110  Lee claimed 
this was his doing, though other commentators attributed Fitzpiers’s capitulation to a 
show of force by Ormond and the recently arrived lord lieutenant, Essex.111  Although 
Fitzpiers had suffered some significant military losses leading up to his submission,112 
Essex held his own anti-Ormond views which may have led Fitzpiers to expect greater 
leniency now that Ormond had been replaced by a rival.  Whatever the case, James 
Fitzpiers was soon restored to favour and, once again, commended in official 
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correspondence for his intrepid martial exploits against the crown’s Irish enemies.  In 
fact, after all the acrimony directed towards Ormond, even Fitzpiers’s erstwhile adversary 
applauded his valuable assistance against the rebels,113 and Lord Deputy Mountjoy went 
so far as to recommend rewarding Fitzpiers’s good services with a knighthood.114  Quite 
astonishingly, once forgiven for his involvement in Lee’s ill-conceived conspiracy, it 
would seem that English administrators had no further doubts about which side James 
Fitzpiers was on.   
Captain Thomas Lee was not nearly so fortunate.  Following the council’s 
investigation, Lee was released from prison and resumed military service under the 
recently appointed Essex.  But, unlike Fitzpiers, Lee was unable to satisfactorily extricate 
himself from future treasonous associations and he was soon embroiled in yet another 
dangerous conspiracy to exonerate the disgraced lord lieutenant, Essex.115  The outcome 
was disastrous.  Captain Thomas Lee died a traitor before O’Neill ever came to terms 
with the crown.  Ormond, on the other hand, survived the war intact and remained one of 
the most powerful officers in Ireland.116     
The wartime behaviour of James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald is anything but 
straightforward.  Political allegiances were complicated and multifaceted, something 
which Hugh O’Neill and some English administrators seemed to have grasped at the 
time.  But, while Fitzpiers’s case reveals the complexity of the times, it also highlights 
some very intriguing features at play during the Nine Years’ War.  It demonstrates 
O’Neill’s desire to draw Old English Palesmen into his fight and, in doing so, he was 
shrewd, calculating, and adaptable.  He appealed directly to the individual in terms 
designed to tug at spiritual and patriotic heartstrings with progressively sophisticated 
                                                
113 Ormond to privy council, 24 Jan. 1600 (ibid., SP 63/207(1)/40); Lord Justice Carey to Cecil, [11 Feb.] 
1600 (ibid., SP 63/207(1)/97); Fynes Moryson, ‘The Rebellion of Hugh Earle of Tyrone’ in Moryson, An 
Itinerary, Part II, (1617), pp 60-1.   
114 Mountjoy to Cecil, 9 Apr. 1600 (T.N.A., SP 63/207(2)/97); Mountjoy to privy council, 9 Jun. 1600 
(ibid., SP 63/207(3)/93).  
115 Lee is famously known for his attempted ambush of the Queen in order to obtain the release of Essex: 
McGurk, ‘Hugh Ó Neill’ pp 11-25; Morgan, ‘Tom Lee’, pp 157-8; Myers, ‘Murdering heart…murdering 
hand’, pp 47-60; Myers, ‘Early English colonial experiences’, pp 8-21. 
116 Edwards, Ormond lordship, pp 264, 337. 
 29 
logic.  Even though Fitzpiers may have been Protestant, O’Neill was willing to work 
around this by appealing to Fitzpiers in terms of his natural bond and duty to his native 
land: Ireland.  Nevertheless, O’Neill still found it an uphill task to persuade dedicated 
crown servants such as Fitzpiers to defend their homeland from foreign aggression.  
Where O’Neill failed, Captain Thomas Lee succeeded.  He persuaded Fitzpiers to 
participate in a dangerous conspiracy and convinced him of the righteousness in doing so.  
But the ultimate goal of his pretended revolt was to vanquish his own rival, Ormond; 
suppressing the rebellion and solidifying crown authority in Ireland seem only to have 
been a desirable corollary.  Personal ambition, internecine rivalries, and self-protection 
loomed large in the minds of all individuals, and these were equally, if not more, 
important than any notion of loyalty to a distant monarch or attachment to native soil.  
Presumably, many other Old Englishmen found themselves in similarly awkward 
situations, but probably with far less favourable outcomes.  Therefore, the actions and 
experiences of James Fitzpiers Fitzgerald may serve as an example for what might have 
inspired many weaker or less-known Old Englishmen to revolt or conspire against their 
English Protestant Queen, or indeed, to stay loyal whatever the pressures or 
consequences.   
